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ontology as fundamental if not foundational to its sociological programme (Bhaskar,
1998)butassertsthatanysocialtheoryisnecessarilycommittedtoan(implicitorexplicit)
ontology (Archer, 1995). Apart from critical realists, examples of theorists who have
pressedthequestionof(social)ontologyareBrunoLatour(e.g.2005),JohnLaw(2004),





pora, 1989; Varela andHarré, 1996; Harré 2002a, 2002b). One feature of this debate
whichmightaccountforitsprotractednatureisthatitinvolvesanumberofissuesfun














remain logicallyobscure.Togivebutan indicationofwhysuchproblemsappeare.g.withregard to the
conceptofsociety,ifonedoesnotpayattentiontothedetailsofthe‘logicalbehaviour’oftheconcept,one
easilyendsuptreating‘society’asalwaysdoingaggregatework,andthereforeistakentorefertoawhole
consistingof partswhicheither addup their sum isnot enough tomake thatwhole.Both
			 and
	 conceptions rely on this ‘mereological’ understanding.On theother hand it is quite clear that
sociologyhasutilisedthemanydifferentsensesof‘society’tobringunderitsaegisdiverseformsofinquiry,
whichare thus justifiedassociological.Consider,e.g.TalcottParsons in	
	





batedunder theauspicesof competing social ontologies. Indeed, approaching them in
socialontology terms isanoveltyof thepastcoupleofdecadesorso thatpresumably














ceptualconfusion.3Socialontologyprojects, farfromredressingwhat isproblematic in
theabove responses,unfortunately constitute ‘moreof the same’. In somecases, as in




of sociology by talk of ‘ontology’ constitutes an improvement over the way in which
quite traditional issues aredebatedandwhether, yet another turn towhat areproperly
understoodasphilosophicalwaysofthinking,engendersanythingbutcontinuingconfu
sion.Thesideeffectoftheturntoquestionsofthissortisthataperspicuousanswerto








                                                                                                                                            
“society”.Thissynthesisofwhathadbeenbeforeregardedasquitedisparateaspectsofhumanlifewasa






























Firstly, little, if anything, is usually done byway of attempting to disclaim the
metaphysicalbaggagethatthepursuitofontologycarrieswithit.Consider,forinstance,
Theodore Schatzki’s definition of ‘social ontology’which, depending on one’s inclina
tions,canbereadeitherasaddingnothingtowhatsocialtheoryorsociologyareabout,
or,alternatively,asanopen invitationtodebateultimatereality: ‘Socialontologyexam




Secondly, incaseswheresuchaneffort is in factmade(e.g.Bhaskar,1975)the
result ends up being contradictory,4precisely because there is no genuine intention to
giveupthetranscendental tobeginwith.Theunclarityconcerningthecommitmentto




vigour but due to a certainmisconception regarding language coupledwith a form of
questioningthatisriddledwithconfusion.Doingontologyamounts,ineffect,tohaving
alicensetosubjectallrelevantexpressionstothequestion‘whatentitydoesitreferto?’
andwhat these expressions are about, in turn, to the question ‘is it real?’ without any




of a notablemoment in the history of sociological debatewhere one of the acknowl
edgedprogenitorsofthenowveryinfluentialCriticalRealismturnedagainstitforbeing
‘metaphysicallymisguided’aboutwhatisorcanbereal.Specifically,IwillscrutinizeRom





reality.This idea,whichIwillbearguingagainst,comesup inCriticalRealist thinking,
and it also underlies thewayHarré is attackingCriticalRealism, appearances notwith
standing6. Because the confusion in ontological reasoning is deepseated and tricky to






















in fact it is difficult to see the question of ontological status as anything other than a












expressions. This will lead us to the examination of two (critical) realist staples, “the
causal criterion”,which is the critical realistmeans for decidingwhether something is
‘real’,andtheirrenderingofthe‘real’asthe‘nonobserveable’.
Asnotedearlier,itisanimportantfactthatontologyhasnotshakenoffacertain
numbness as to its precise nature. Typically, in the explication of ontological inquiry
wordssuchas ‘real’, ‘exist’, ‘reality’, ‘being’etc.areconscripted inuses thatareseenas
constitutiveofwhat it is todoontology.Thusontologycanbesaidtobethestudyof
thatwhichis,ofwhatexists,ofwhatisreal,ofthebeingofthings,orthestudyofulti
matereality.Accordingly,questionssuchas,forexample,‘isXreal?’,‘doesXexist?’be
come pseudotechnical expressions8that are guaranteed to apply			 if the









indirectly) therulesfortheuseofexpressions.Scarequotesclothe ‘true’abovetoemphasisethat ‘gram
maticaltruths’arenotopposedto‘grammaticalfalsehoods’buttononsense,andthattosaythatagram
maticalstatementistrueistosaythatthesearetherules.Rulescannotbesaidtobetrueorfalsebutcanbe
said to determinewhat counts as (
 	) true and false (see Long& Jolley, 2010). Also, as P.M.S.
















partof realitycanbemorecomplicated thanweare inclined to thinkwhen theorising.








guitar without being a real Fender. Given these facts about the use of ‘real’ we have






not a fake,ornot adecoy,ornotapictureof,ornot ahologram.Crucially 	
			
dependsonthekindofcontrastthatisbeingmadeandhence,intheposi







toproperties. Ingeneral,where“W” isapropertyword, then“notW” isalsoaproperty





fromthe fact the ‘object’needs tobespecified too).WhatAustinhas inmindpresumably is thewayof
pickingoutanindividualwiththeuseofavariablewithoutincludinganyindicationastothekindofthing
itis,andthereforenotincludinganyindicationastosomeofthewaysinwhichthatkindcanbereal.	
10Austin notes in  
 			



























implications for the pursuit of an ontologywhich, in one of its aspects, involves pro
nouncing once and for all onwhich kind of things are real andwhich arenot.Given
theseordinaryfactsconsiderwhatwouldhappenifwetriedtocompilethelistofallthe
kindsofthingsthat		.Theresultsofsuchanendeavourwouldruninto
the followingcomplications:Wewouldeither endupwitha list thatwouldcontain

$	 of thingsor$	 of things, sincewe can eithermakea kindoutof all things
whichcanbesaid tobe real (forevenhallucinationscanbereal12)oradmitonlykinds
whosesubordinateobjectscanbeunreal(			) innoothersense(forexample,








, it isdubiouswhetheritmakessensetoapply‘real’ in
	withoutrestriction.That is,weunderstandwhatrealasopposedtocounterfeit
are,butwhatisittohavenoncounterfeit	+
Naturally, thosewho see promise in the ontologicalmode of thinking are not
botheredby these factsbut attempt to render them irrelevantbynotbeing concerned
with ‘all real things’ butwith ‘all	



















‘ontological’ purposesweportray that relation in the formofwhat seems a trivial and
obvioustruthinsayingthat‘realthingsarepartofreality’13.Butwhatabout‘realances




13One of the perennial (indeed Socratic)wayswe are led to such confusions is by assenting to truistic
questionsordissentingtoobviouslyfalseoneswhenwearenotsurewhatwearesaying.Socrates’trusistc
orflagrantlyfalseformulationswouldbedesignedtosolicittheassentordissentofhisinterlocutorupon
production ofwhich hewould then proceed todemonstrate incoherence– the interlocutorwould then





tors’and ‘realhallucinations’, are theypartof reality?14To theextent that thisquestion
encouragesus togiveaquick ‘yes’or ‘no’answer it ismisleading.Foras it stands, the
questioncallsforclarification(cf.PI§62).
It seemsaneasy task todividewhat is real fromwhat isunreal,butas argued,
thatappearanceiswrong,forthemomentwetrytoapplythedichotomyexhaustively,in
















ontology, or in the case immediately above linguistic theory, cannot work because it




asapplicable inallcases is toohigh; it isnothing less thanconceptualconfu
sion.16






























































fects in a certain sensemay have its home in certain activities. For example: ‘Is this
snakereal?’,‘Yes,becarefulitwillbiteyou,italreadybitMary’.Butthereareonlycer









                                                                                                                                            
confusion.WewillexpandinChapterXontheforcingofamodeofexpressionintermsofoperatingona
‘grammaticalscheme’.
17ConsideralsowhatArcherhas tosay: ‘ontological statusneeds tobeaccorded tosuchaggregate (and
emergent)socialpropertiespreciselytheyaremechanismsfacilitatingorfrustratingvariouspoli
cies’(1990:87,quotedinElderVass2007a:27)and‘’Theexistenceofstructuralpropertiesandpowersis
established by the 

 		, that is in terms of generative effects’( Archer 2000 quoted in Varela
2007:204)




analytic statement, not a 







As isevidentfromBhaskar’squotation, the identificationofwhat isrealwithwhathas
realeffectsfeedsbackintotheontologyandenablesitsstratification(actual,real,experi
ential) by extension towards the nonobservable. The rationale seems to be that since
therearethingswhichcanbesaidtocausebutarenotobservable,thereforethereal is
notonlythatwhichwecanperceive.Theimprovementofthisconceptionispresumably
mostpronouncedwhencontrastedwithanempiricistontologywhich is limited toob
servables.19However, Bhaskar does not eschew the selfsame impoverished empiricist
understanding ofwhat is observable and,most importantly, 








not intelligibleas it stands.21It is thusbetter toavoidgivingayesornoanswer to the
questionwhether the social is observable or nonobservable.Consider, however,what
MargaretArcherhastosayon‘nonobservables’:

“Someof thenonobservable social factorswhichconcernusmaybeopen tohumanistic hermeneutics






Now it is hardly clear what it means to say that institutional contradictions are non
observable(whatwould itmeantoobservethem?)andevenfurtherthat theyarenon
observeableentities(recallBhaskar’squotation)!Ontheotherhand,speakingofthenon
observability ofmotives constitutes a return to the locus classicus of the in principle
‘nonobserveable’whichis,ofcourse,thehumanmind.22
                                                 
19“Implicitinthe…critiqueofempiricistontologyandthediscussionoflawsoftendencywasanattack












tionwerepaid toRyle’s insight regarding themental/physical problem,whose existence is owed to the
misapplicationofanumberofconceptswhichcanapplytothephysicalbutnottotheconceptofmental.


















ciesmay be possessed unexercised, exercised unrealized, and realized unperceived (or
undetected)bymen”(1975:175)becauseitisdeeplyincoherent.Ifwelookattheexam
pleshe invokes24it isclear thatnoneofthemwarranthisconception:
,


























































	 isnottoreportwhathewilldogivencertaincircumstances(because it is
notentirelyuptohim)butwhattheusualoutcomeofhimcompetingis.Yetagainhav
ing the tendency towincannotbepossessedunexercised, i.e.unless someonehas fre
quentlywoninthepast.Althoughonecanfailtowinonceormoreandyetnotlosethe
towin, it isnotclear that this issofortheir  towinwhich isastatistical















by saying that society, institutional contradictions, financial sys
tems,andtherestarenonobservableandnot(beforewecandothat)tofindatechnical
meansofdetection (which iswhat is lacking in thepostulationofparticles inphysics).
Thisdiscrepancyisalsoobscuredbycalling‘nonobsevables’whatseemasbeingamat
teroflargescale(society)oraresmallandhidden(themind).But,again,theproblemis
one of understandingwhat itwouldmean to observe ‘society’ not onewhere there is
somerestrictiontowhatwecanintelligiblydo.Oncewespecifywhatwewouldcountas
observingsocietyorthemind,weseethatthereisnothinginprinciplenonobserveable
aboutmental thingsor about ‘large scaleprocesses’.For instance, one canwitness the
depressioninone’sneighbourandatthesametimetheeffectsoftheeconomiccrisison
Greeksocietyinone’sneighbourhood.And,withthepossessionoftherequiredmeans,








































lectual progenitor ofCriticalRealism (CR), he assumes a positionmuch closer to the,









Inorder tounderstandwhat thedirect targetofHarré’sattackcouldbe, it isuseful to
enquireintothepremisesoftheCriticalRealist27position.CRavoidswhatBhaskar(1975)









is structuredandcomplexandnotmade formen. It is entirely accidental thatweexist, andunderstand
somethingaboutourbitinit.’(Bhaskar,1975,p.250)







instructive in that it provides a clear formulation of the standard against which SC is
foundwanting.Basedonthegeneralconceptionof	articulatedinBhaskar’sreason













the foundation to amethodologywhichdefines theobjectiveof social science, as ‘ex
amin[ing]theinterplaybetweenthesetwosetsofpowersandproperties’(Carter,2002,p.
134).




theory (2002,p. 124).Presumably,Harré’s attack is seen tobedevastatingnotonly in
that, asCarter (2002, p. 134) registers, it denies the viability of amethodological pro














theyarenot real ‘inany 
	 sense’ (Harré,2002b,p.147). Iwillgoon tobriefly
sketchhisargumentbutIwillonlyelaborateonthepartsrelevanttotheproblemofon
tology.






cial structure, respectively). Social structures are understood byHarré to be secondary
products ‘of theactivityofpeopleactingaccording to rules,customsandconventions’











ologists – and I includemyself among them – are ‘wellmeaning butmetaphysicallymisguided people’’
(2002,p.124)(myitalics).OnecouldtakeissueherewithStrydom’stalkofabeingamyth.Itmakes




































people jointly performedwithin the frames of possibility that they determined. But both















In this section I attempt to demonstrate that whatHarré says has an only superficial
Wittgensteiniancharacter and, also,why thecomparisonwithWittgenstein is a clue to






















































theymean ‘itmakesno sense to say these things’ (in thewaywe think itdoes); itwould,
therefore,equallymakenosensetosayofmethatIdonotknowwhatIamthinking,orthat




Basedon theabove, it is clear that to show that thequestionof thecausal efficacyof




causethequestion issenselessandequallysenseless is theresponsethat itdoesnotgo
anywhere’.30Harréthough,inprovidinganargumentinsupportofthethesisthatsocial
structuresarenotcausallyefficacious isattempting to theCritical realists,amove
whichamountstoprovinganopposingthesisand,therefore,heisclearlypresupposing
rather than challenging the sense of the question. Furthermore, he is treating what it
makessensetosayaspickingoutsomeultimaterealitycapturedbytheparsimoniouson
tologyheissubstitutingforthecriticalrealistone.Harré’sreminderthatindoingsociol





























































































class’andsimilarmacroconcepts isacase inpoint.Youdonotexplainwhya lionprefersmeatby
tellingusitisacarnivore.(2002b,p.143)’







In this sectionIconfront the idea that there is somethingwrong (i.e.ontologicallyun
sound) in someway or otherwith talking about classes, structures, capitalism, groups,
societyoremployingahostofotherexpressionsthatareusedinthedescriptionandex











and throughdependenton common terms), that is to say 
	
, but
























toRussell’s idea. JohnCookboth illuminates and rebuts the implications for ordinary
language(i.e.naturallanguage)thattheidealofalogicallyproperlanguagecarriesinhis
superbarticleonthefateofordinarylanguagephilosophy.Cookdubsthemisconception
atwork the ‘pictureof languageas a conceptual schema’.  In the followingpassagehe
sumsupboththepictureanditsrefutation:

Thechiefelementsof thatpicturewere these:ordinary language isamapof theontological terrain,but
whereasitoughttobeagoodmap,philosophershaveshownittobequiteapoorone,andthereforethe
concepts ofordinary language stand inneedof correctionbyphilosophers (andperhapsby scientists as
well)
[…]



















cepts embody the ‘commonsenseviewof theworld’with the idea that language is an
ontological map is a crucial step towards understanding Archer’s conception (this is
Bhaskar’sconceptiontoo[seeCruickshank,2010]and,morerecently,ElderVass’s[2006,
pp.34]).Thereasonhedoessoisbecauseunderthepictureoflanguageasa‘conceptual






























sharprelief that, insteadofquestioningwhetherwemustadhere to thispictureof lan





































Whatcannotbeconcludedfromthis,however, is thatoneofthesetwouses is
somehowontologicallysuperiorbecauseitisbasedonreferringto(real?)entitieswhereas
theotherway isontologicallyempty.It isonethingtopointouttosomeonethat they
should not think of changing the structure as changing something additional to social
practicesanditisquiteanothertoclaimthat‘[t]oputitbluntly,inthisuniverse,thereare













attention towhatcontrast, for instance, ismarkedby the insistenceonchangingsocial
structures(e.g.thatitisnotonlyindividualcasesweneedtochangeor,tousearelatively



































matter of speaking ontologically unsoundEnglish, for there is noontologyor theorybuilt into the lan
guage.
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It is thepursuitofanontologywhichfuels thesemisconceptions,basedas it ison the







material things inmostways (apart fromthe fact that theyaresomehownotmaterial).
Hence, theseother ‘entities’endupasmysteriousones!Togiveoneexamplefromthe
philosophicaldisputeson	,alotofconfusionhasbeengeneratedbytheimplicitrea









Based on the above, then, it can be seen thatHarré’s way of confronting the
criticalrealistsbyaskingwhetherXisa)causallyefficaciousandthereforeb)realand(as
wewill shortly see)c)capableofexplaining, inorder toestablishwhether it shouldbe
admitted intoourontology,onwhich, in turn,hangs thequestionofwhether itmakes
sense to want to change social structures, is equally misconceived as thinking that to
change social structures is to change something out there hovering over our heads (a
mistakeofthekindHarréattributestothecriticalrealists).Moreover,Harré’sconclusion
totheeffectthatonlypersonsarecausallyefficaciouscannotbeseenasaprofounddis
covery that forms thebasisof aparsimoniousontology. Instead, it could be acknowl






compatible with my theory of causal powers which you frequently invoke; scientific
causalconceptscannotapplytowhatisnotapowerfulparticular’.Still,sucharesponse
would fail to take into account thatwe can and douse causal concepts in connection
with social structure expressions.Thepoint is not to judge theseusesby appealing to





                                                 










hopefully throw some light on how the outlawing of certain forms of expression on
groundsofcausalefficacy(amovewhichmaybemisleadinglypresentedintheformof
notadmittingentitiesintoourontology)issupportedbytheideathatlocatingcausaleffi












The above exhibits rather nicelyHarré’s position whichwas based from its inception
(Harré,1970)onanattackon thepositivist conceptionof scientific explanationwhich
regarded the latter as amatterof establishingnomic relationsbetweenevents. Instead,
Harré,emphasisedthecentralrolemechanismsplay inaccountingforthe relationsbe
tweeneventsandhence identifiedcausalmechanismsas theproperobjectofscientific













ontologicalmatters in social thought. I have tried to exploit someWittgensteinian ele
ments,whichareinvokedbutnotgivendueweightinHarré’sargument(2002a,2002b),
in order to suggest that the ontological project is confused and to identifyone of the
sourcesofconfusioninadistortivepictureoflanguageandexplanation.
Onemoraltobedrawnisthatitiswellworththinkingtwiceaboutwhethercast
ing the issues thatdivideopposingsociological schools in termsofontologydoesany
thing to help make their differences clearer. The reason is that it transposes the dis
agreementtoaplateauofconfusionmostlygeneratedbythepreoccupationwith‘entities’












Inconclusion, Iwill try tomakeperspicuousone final timea fundamentaldis







Towitness the transition, consider an excerpt fromRichard Jenkins’ recent polemical
pieceonthesociologicalusesofthenotionofstructure,whereheattemptstoprovidea
rationale forascribingadifferentontological status tocollectivitiesasopposed to indi
viduals.Hebeginsbygoingdownthefamiliarmaterial/immaterialpath,atsomepoint,
however,heclaimsthat: ‘Collectivitieshaveadistinctiveontologicalstatus:theydonot




of settling   in which collectivities can be said to exist, a question not about
whetherthereissomeentityoutthere,butaboutthelogicalbehaviourof‘collectivities’
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